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Abstract 
Network routers are a core component of contemporary SoHo networks. The firmware within these devices 
provides routing, control and monitoring functionality coupled with mechanisms to ensure a secure and reliable 
network. End-users are typically reliant on manufacturers to provide timely firmware updates to mitigate known 
vulnerabilities. An investigation was undertaken to identify the underlying software components used in the 
firmware of currently available, SoHo network devices used in Australia. Firmware from 37 devices was 
deconstructed to identify potential security issues; in each instance, the firmware images were found to include 
vulnerabilities, obsolete software and out-of-date operating system components. 95% of the deconstructed 
firmware was based on Linux. The Linux kernels identified were typically discontinued and are no longer 
actively maintained. This paper demonstrates a method for undertaking the analysis and summaries the 
outcomes of the research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Network device security is an issue for end-users, police and lawmakers alike. Network routers manage the 
connectivity between an end-user’s home network and the Internet. As a result the in-built security in network 
routers often provides the first and last line of defence for potential cyber-attacks. A security breach of a network 
router may allowsa cyber criminal or malicious software unauthorised access to an end-user’s network and the 
internal resources (Jones, 2012). Insecure network devices may also affect other users by allowing attackers to 
launch further attacks from a compromised device (Krebs, 2015). 
Insecure network devices also impact police and lawmakers. Online computer crimes require an Internet 
connection, which may leave forensic evidence in the form of logs, Internet Protocol (IP) address details or even 
device connection statistics. Prosecuting computer-assisted crimes often requires proof of an individual’s 
network identity. Compromised network devices may provide malicious actors with a suitable defence, or even 
falsely identify innocent parties as perpetrators (Bryant, 2009). Some overseas jurisdictions are considering laws 
that require citizens to secure their networking devices. BBC News (2010) reported that a German citizen was 
fined for not securing their Wi-Fi network. The publication Critical Information Infrastructure Protection and 
the Law (Personick & Patterson, 2003) identifies home users as a major source of security hazards; and, asks 
whether end-users should be held accountable for poor device management and security practices. However, Ho, 
Dearman and Truong (2010) argue that implementing adequate security on Small office Home office (SoHo) 
network devices is overly complex for the typically end-user. As a consequence, network devices may remain 
unaltered following the initial install and configuration. 
Cyber criminals may exploit well-documented vulnerabilities that rely on poor security and update practices 
(Denning, Kohno & Levy, 2013) . In order to curb malicious access and help improve personal security, several 
police jurisdictions provide users with advice on best practices for protecting themselves from cyber crime. Both 
Queensland and Western Australian police advise that network device firmware – the device’s internal operating 
system and software components – should be actively managed by checking for and applying firmware updates 
(Western Australia Police, n.d.). This advice is predicated on the fact that network device manufacturers are 
actively updating the device’s firmware as new security issues and vulnerabilities are discovered. 
Firmware is the operating system and software applications that are installed on a device to manage and control 
network communication and provide a graphical user interface to the end-user. A standalone firmware release 
may contain thousands of operating system files, libraries and executable software applications. Core 
functionality of the firmware’s operating system is provided by software called the kernel. The kernel is the 
‘gatekeeper’ for all low-level security and hardware management activities (Love, 2010). It provides the 
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 operating framework and controls access to components including the file-system, Random Access Memory 
(RAM), network interfaces, and Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports. The remaining operating system consists of 
utility programs and system libraries, which provide an abstraction layer between high-level software (like a 
user-interface) and the low-level system management operations. Utility programs like the operating system 
“command shell”; network configuration applications; and firewall management tools, simplify access to system 
resources. Libraries provide common functionality that may be shared across multiple parts of the operating 
system and applications. High-level executable applications provide features like: the end-user configuration 
wizards; built-in webservers; firewall services; internet access protocols; and user and password management 
tools. Some network devices may also include value added applications that are not directly related to network 
access. These may include applications like: file servers; digital media players; printer servers; or personal cloud 
storage services. Firmware features rely on the complex interactions between many executable files, libraries and 
kernel components. These are linked together and communicate by passing information along many chains of 
linked components. The security of the firmware’s operating system is reliant on the strength and reliability of 
these chains and linked components.  
The security and stability of SoHo network devices is subject to the reliability and quality of its firmware release 
(Papp, Ma & Buttyan, 2015). As firmware ages, new vulnerabilities are uncovered by researchers, cyber 
criminals or enthusiasts. Well-supported firmware is regularly updated and has security vulnerabilities addressed 
in a timely manner.  It is the responsibility of manufacturers to ensure that all operating system components are 
based on secure, well-supported software; and, to ensure that there are no flawed links in the chain of firmware 
components.  
Firmware components were previously analysed by Costin, Zaddach, Francillon, and Balzarotti (2014), who 
developed an automated system for scanning and examining firmware. They developed a suite of tools to locate 
firmware images, and subsequently unpack and analyse their components. Using this method, Costin et al. 
(2014) were able to identify previously unknown vulnerabilities in hundreds of firmware files located on 
manufacturer websites. Costin et al.  (2014) examined the use of fuzzy hashing techniques to recognise almost 
identical files. For normal hashes: two matching hash values, for two separate files, provide statistical certainty 
that the file contents are identical. Unfortunately, this certainty is a source of error when attempting to match 
‘almost’ identical files, as changing a single byte within a file, will result in an unpredictable different hash 
value. Files that are functionally identical yet differ in size and content are frequently identified in compiled 
software applications. This is because the same application, compiled from identical sources, can be assembled 
differently depending on a range of settings at the time of compilation (file creation). As such, simple hash-wise 
comparison of firmware components may not yield useful information. The method used by Costin et al. (2014) 
used a type of fuzzy hashing technique to divide large files into small components and examine these component 
based on hashes. Whilst powerful, the aforementioned method is computationally expensive. 
Based on the obvious need for network device security, coupled the findings of Costin et al. (2014) this research 
undertook a targeted in-depth survey of SoHo network devices in Australia. As most SoHo router firmware is 
based on open-source operating systems and components (Jones, 2012), it was theorised that a holistic view of 
device firmware currency and manufacturer security practices, could be obtained by more direct component 
version identification strategies. This research survey attempted to create and validate a proof of concept method 
for extracting and identifying component version information from firmware images; and, an overview of 
firmware currency for a range of SoHo network devices currently being sold or offered to consumers in 
Australia. 
RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN 
The research questions to be addressed through this research paper were; 
1. Can a method by developed to identify component version information for SoHo router firmware 
images? 
2. Are SoHo router firmware images secure and using up-to-date software components? 
The questions were addressed by analysing current network device models to determine the underlying software 
components contained within the latest firmware release. The latest firmware for each device was downloaded 
from the manufacture’s support web page. The firmware’s content were extracted for component version 
analysis. The version number and release dates were recorded for each firmware release and compared to the 
version numbers and release dates for selected firmware components. 
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 Unpacking firmware image content 
In order to identify the core components of a firmware release, a combination of Linux based tools and utilities 
were used to access the firmware’s binary content. Each firmware image was first run through the binwalk 
application to extract its contents. Binwalk is an open source analysis and reverse engineering tool for firmware 
images (Binwalk, 2015). 
 
 
$ binwalk -e FW_XAC1900_1.1.42.162280_prod.img  
 
DECIMAL       HEXADECIMAL     DESCRIPTION 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
0 0x0 TRX firmware header, little endian, header size: 28 bytes, image size: 15142912 bytes, 
CRC32: 0xC4CEA69F flags: 0x0, version: 1 
28 0x1C LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 65536 bytes, uncompressed size: 
5494368 bytes 
2319408 0x236430 Squashfs file-system, little endian, version 4.0, compression:lzma (non-
standard type definition), size: 12818155 bytes,  3022 inodes, blocksize: 131072 bytes, created: Fri Jul 11 
11:04:22 2014 
 
Figure 1 – Sample firmware extraction using binwalk to reveal the Squashfs file-system 
After extraction with binwalk, any embedded file-systems were unpacked to reveal the firmware’s operating 
system, files and configurations. Depending on the file-system type, different extraction utilities were used. 
Firmware containing “Squash-FS” file-systems were extracted using “sasquatch”, while JFFS file-systems were 
mounted directly using built in Linux modules. 
 
$ cd _FW_XAC1900_1.1.42.162280_prod.img.extracted 
$ ls -l 
total 32680 
-rw-r--r-- 1 501 dialout  5494368 Sep 24 11:35 1C 
-rw-r--r-- 1 501 dialout 15143140 Sep 24 11:35 1C.7z 
-rw-r--r-- 1 501 dialout 12818155 Sep 24 11:36 236430.squashfs 
 
#sasquatch 236430.squashfs 
SquashFS version [4.0] / inode count [3011] suggests a SquashFS image of the same endianess 
Parallel unsquashfs: Using 1 processor 
Trying to decompress using default xz decompressor... 
Successfully decompressed with default xz decompressor 
2786 inodes (2917 blocks) to write 
… 
… 
created 2299 files 
created 225 directories 
created 496 symlinks 
created 0 devices 
created 0 fifos 
 
Figure 2 - Squash-fs extraction using sasquatch 
Device firmware was downloaded and extracted to an organised directory structure identified by 
manufacturer/device/firmware_release. Examination of component version information was accomplished using 
readily available Linux programs and commands. This allowed for scripting searches across all extracted content 
from multiple manufacturers and devices simultaneously. 
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 $ ls -l 
total 0 
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 136 Sep 16 12:02 avm 
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 170 Sep 16 12:02 billion 
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 170 Sep 16 12:02 budii 
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 578 Sep 13 12:30 dlink 
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 238 Sep 24 11:31 linksys 
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 204 Sep 14 14:46 netcomm 
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 578 Sep 25 10:10 netgear 
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 374 Sep 16 12:02 tplink 
 
$ ls -l linksys/XAC1900/_FW_XAC1900_1.1.42.162280_prod.img.extracted/squashfs-root/ 
total 16 
drwx------ 1 501 dialout 2958 Sep 25 16:19 bin 
drwx------ 1 501 dialout   68 Jul 11  2014 cgroup 
drwx------ 1 501 dialout   68 Jul 11  2014 dev 
drwx------ 1 501 dialout 2448 Jul 11  2014 etc 
… 
drwx------ 1 501 dialout  646 Jul 11  2014 www 
 
$ find . -name "busybox" 
./avm/Fritz7490/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox 
./avm/Fritz7490/fmk/rootfs/squashfs-root/bin/busybox 
./billion/7800NXL/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox 
./billion/7800VDPX/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox 
… 
./dlink/DAP-1650/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox 
… 
Figure 3 - Extracted file-system content of “find” operation to identify BusyBox files across firmware images 
FIRMWARE CURRENCY EVALUATION 
To examine firmware currency based on included components, the firmware images were scanned for known 
elements. These were in turn analysed to identify version numbers and subsequently release dates. The firmware 
kernel and command shell were chosen for identification as they represent a significant part of an operating 
system’s security and control architecture. Other libraries and executables were chosen to help develop proof of 
concept version identification strategies and provide a holistic assessment of device firmware currency by 
examining component level information. Components selected for version analysis are shown below in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Components selected for version identification 
 
COMPONENT FUNCTION VERSION SOURCE 
Linux Kernel Provides core operating system functionality. https://www.kernel.org/ 
(Linux Kernel Organization, n.d.) 
BusyBox Provides the operating system “shell” which allows 
interaction between components using commands 
and scripts. 
http://www.busybox.net/   
(Andersen, 2015) 
OpenSSL Security and encryption library. Used to provide 
identity verification and signatures for a range of 
secure applications. 
http://www.netfilter.org/ 
(OpenSSL Software Foundation, 
2015) 
iptables Provides interfaces to configure kernel network 
firewall features. 
http://www.netfilter.org/  
(Welte & Ayuso, 2014) 
MiniDLNA Media server able to send media files to network 
media players (Televisions, Play Station 4, Xbox 
360 etc.). 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/mi
nidlna/   
(Maggard, 2015) 
+ Internet searches 
SSHd Secure Shell Daemon. Provides remote access to a 
device through a secure “command” shell. 
http://www.openssh.com/ 
(OpenBSD, 2009) 
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 Version identification was achieved through a range of strategies, which were developed for each specific target 
component or application. While some libraries and applications contain an easily recognisable version string for 
example “version=1.2.3”, others may be programed or compiled with constructions that require reverse 
engineering or more complex searches to identify version information. The strategies developed for each 
compiled binary are shown in Table 2. 
Identified versions numbers of firmware component files were compared to known version numbers found in 
each application’s source code or online “project pages”.  Project pages and Google searches were used to 
identify the most accurate source for the most specific or earliest mention of the component’s version number. 
Identification of the kernel version number 
Each firmware’s kernel version was identified by examining strings available in kernel modules.  These modules 
typically contain a static “version magic” string that identifies the kernel version for which it was made 
(Salzman, Burian, & Pomerantz, 2005). Regular expression matches and the Linux egrep utility were used to 
identify the “vermagic=” string and indicated version numbers. The version numbers and original release dates 
for each kernel were identified using the data from the Linux kernel archives website (Linux Kernel 
Organization, n.d.). 
 
$ find . -name "*.ko"|head -1 | xargs egrep -a -o –i -b "vermagic=.*" 
 
74256:vermagic=2.6.36.4 
Figure 4 - Identification of kernel version 
Identify the operating system BusyBox ‘command shell’ version number 
BusyBox includes its version details and compile time information in an embedded static string. This can be 
extracted by using regular expression searches – the same way as kernel version numbers were identified. 
 
$ find . -name "busybox" | xargs egrep -a -o -b "BusyBox v.*" 
 
./billion/7800NXL/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox:317007:BusyBox v1.17.2 … 
./dlink/DSL-2544N/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox:344412:BusyBox v1.6.1 …  
./netcomm/3G29WN/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox:190302:BusyBox v1.00 …  
… 
Figure 5 - Identification of BusyBox “Shell” version 
Other component specific search and version identification strategies 
For other applications, certain string sequences were identified from project websites, or through reverse 
engineering of the binary files to identify symbolic placeholders and offsets within the executable file or 
associated libraries. A summary of component specific search strategies is provided below in Table 2. 
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 Table 2 - Search strategies used for software version identification 
 
COMPONENT SPECIFIC SEARCH AND VERSION IDENTIFICATION STARTEGIES 
COMPONENT: 
Linux Kernel 
STRATEGY: 
Examination of .ko kernel modules for “vermagic=” string. 
 Find a kernel module usually files ending in .ko 
 Search through the .ko file using grep/egrep 
 Search Expression: “vermagic.*” 
EXAMPLE COMMANDS: 
$find . -name "*.ko" |head -1|xargs egrep -a -o –i -b "vermagic=.*" 
EXAMPLE RESULT: 
74256:vermagic=2.6.36.4 
 
COMPONENT: 
BusyBox Shell 
STRATEGY: 
Examination of /bin/busybox binary file. 
 Check if bin/busybox exists 
 Search through busybox binary using grep/egrep 
 Search Expression: “BusyBox .*” 
EXAMPLE COMMANDS: 
$egrep -a -o -b "BusyBox .*" squashfs-root/bin/busybox 
EXAMPLE RESULT: 
489504:BusyBox v1.15.2 (2014-07-10 17:36:08 PDT) 
 
COMPONENT: 
OpenSSL/libssl 
STRATEGY: 
Examination of known version ‘patterns’ for libssl library version numbers 
 Search for possible three part version numbers and optional ‘letters’ 
 Sanity check against known libssl versions 
 Search Expression: "[0-2]\.[0-9]\.[0-9][a-z]*" 
EXAMPLE COMMANDS: 
#find . -name "libssl.so.*" | xargs egrep -a -o -b -i "[0-2]\.[0-9]\.[0-9][a-z]*" 
 
EXAMPLE RESULT: 
… 
212922:0.9.8za 
… 
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 COMPONENT SPECIFIC SEARCH AND VERSION IDENTIFICATION STARTEGIES 
COMPONENT: 
iptables 
STRATEGY: 
Versions of iptables since 2002 have been numbered between 1.2.7 and 1.4.21. 
 Find iptables files 
 Search for string sequence matches with similar numbering conventions. 
 Sanity check for version number and release date from iptables website 
 Search Expression: “1.[2-4].[0-9]{1,2}.*” 
 
EXAMPLE COMMANDS: 
$ find . -name "iptables" | xargs egrep -a -o -b "1.[2-4].[0-9]{1,2}" 
EXAMPLE RESULT: 
54193:1.4.12 
 
COMPONENT: 
MiniDLNA (media server) 
STRATEGY: 
The excutable contains the strings “MiniDLNA version ..” 
 Find minidlna files 
 Search for string sequence containing “MiniDLNA version” 
EXAMPLE COMMANDS: 
$ find . –name “minidlna” | xargs egrep –a –o –b –I “MiniDLNA version .*” 
EXAMPLE RESULT: 
usr/bin/minidlna:176524:MiniDLNA version 1.0.24 [SQLite %s] 
 
COMPONENT: 
SSHd 
STRATEGY: 
Examination of multiple source files showed dropbear sshd being used (Johnston, 2015). The name 
dropbear is included in the version string. This also gave clues as to the version numbering for SSHd 
servers not including the dropbear string. 
 Identify dropbear_versions 
 Identify remaining SSHd versions 
 Requilar expression match for dropbear 
 String search for 0.[4-5]* in other versions 
EXAMPLE COMMANDS: 
$ find . -name "sshd" | xargs egrep -s -a -o -b -i "dropbear.*\.[4-5][0-9]*" 
EXAMPLE RESULTS: 
… bin/sshd:187009:dropbear_0.46 
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 COMPONENT SPECIFIC SEARCH AND VERSION IDENTIFICATION STARTEGIES 
COMPONENT: 
sqlite 
STRATEGY: 
Reverse engineering of SQLite3 showed that the libsqlite3.so shared object library contained the 
version number.  
 Retrieve the symbol for sqlite3_version using readelf –s and grep 
 Read the offset of the symbol from the readelf command 
 Read the ‘length’ from the output from the readelf command 
 Use DD to read out the version string using previously identified offset and bytes 
EXAMPLE COMMAND (STEP 1): 
$ readelf -s libsqlite3.so | grep version 
EXAMPLE RESULT (STEP 1): 
235: 00062494     6 OBJECT  GLOBAL DEFAULT   13 sqlite3_version 
EXAMPLE COMMAND (STEP 2): 
$ dd if=libsqulite3.so bs=1 skip=$((0x62494)) count=6 
EXAMPLE RESULT (STEP 2): 
3.5.8 
Firmware Extracted for Analysis 
The firmware for 37 devices were downloaded from manufacture websites. The firmware release dates were 
identified from manufacturer release notes and filenames. The firmware releases were downloaded, extracted 
and the search strategies were executed. The examination was conducted on the following firmware images: 
 
Table 3 - Device model, firmware and sources 
 
Model Firmware 
Date 
Source 
(see section Error! Reference source not found.) 
Billion 7800NXL 27/05/15 Billion Electric Co. Ltd. (2014e) 
Billion 7800VDPX 27/05/15 Billion Electric Co. Ltd. (2014e) 
D-Link DIR-850L 24/07/15 D-Link Australia (2015a) 
D-Link DIR-890L 4/09/15 D-Link Australia (2015b, 2015c) 
D-Link DSL-2544N 11/02/15 D-Link Australia (2014b, 2015d) 
D-Link DSL-2750B 25/02/15 D-Link Australia (2014c) 
D-Link DSL-2877AL 28/05/15 D-Link Australia (2015f) 
D-Link DSL-2880AL 11/09/14 D-Link Australia (2014d, 2014e) 
D-Link DSL-2890AL 7/05/15 D-Link Australia (2014f) 
D-Link DSL-2900AL 8/05/15 D-Link Australia (2014g) 
D-Link DWR-116 16/02/15 D-Link Australia (2015i) 
FRITZ!Box 7490 27/08/15 AVM Computersysteme Vertriebs GmbH (2015) 
iiNet Budii Lite 14/09/15 iiNet Limited (2015) 
Linksys XAC1200 29/05/15 Belkin International (2015b) 
Linksys WRT1900AC 18/06/15 Belkin International (2015a) 
Linksys XAC1900-AU 15/07/14 Belkin International (2014) 
NetComm 3G29WN 7/07/11 NetComm Wireless Limited (2011) 
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 Model Firmware 
Date 
Source 
(see section Error! Reference source not found.) 
NetComm NB16WV-02 2/11/14 NetComm Wireless Limited (2014) 
NetComm NB604N-02 29/04/15 NetComm Wireless Limited (2015) 
NETGEAR CG3100D-2 5/04/12 NETGEAR (2012) 
NETGEAR D6000-100AUS 24/06/15 NETGEAR (2015a) 
NETGEAR D6200-100AUS 18/07/15 NETGEAR (2015b) 
NETGEAR D6400-100AUS 18/07/15 NETGEAR (2015c) 
NETGEAR DGN2200-100AUS 18/07/15 NETGEAR (2015d) 
NETGEAR DM111P-100AUS 29/05/14 NETGEAR (2014) 
NETGEAR R7000-100AUS 26/05/15 NETGEAR (2015e) 
NETGEAR R8000-100AUS 28/05/15 NETGEAR (2015f) 
NETGEAR WNDR3700-100AUS 2/04/15 NETGEAR (2015g) 
NETGEAR WNR2000-200AUS 22/04/15 NETGEAR (2015h) 
TP-LINK Archer C9 27/08/15 TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015a) 
TP-LINK Archer D2 2/09/15 TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015b) 
TP-LINK Archer D7  14/05/15 TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015c) 
TP-LINK Archer D9 14/05/15 TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015d) 
TP-LINK TD-8816 11/03/14 TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2014a) 
TP-LINK TD-W8961N 23/10/14 TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2014b) 
TP-LINK TD-W9980 7/05/15 TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015e) 
TP-LINK W-8968 4/05/15 TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015f) 
RESULTS 
An informal observation of major Australian retailers identified that six brands were typically sold including;  
Netgear, D-Link, TP-Link, Linksys, Belkin, and NetComm. Internet Service Providers sell a combination of 
OEM (self branded) devices, and specialist devices from iiNet (Budii), AVM (Fritz!Box) and Billion. 
The firmware release dates were readily identifiable for all devices except for those manufactured by Netgear. 
Most device manufacturers provide release notes that included the release date and any significant changes. 
Netgear included a date with their release notes, but this was deemed unreliable, as the dates were inconsistent 
and frequently different from information gleaned from web based searches and firmware file-system data. The 
firmware release dates for Netgear devices were inferred from embedded file-system dates, compile time strings 
and industry websites. 
The analysed devices appeared to be well supported with newly released firmware updates. A quarter of 
surveyed devices had new firmware released in the three months prior to the survey; and, a majority of devices 
(84%) had new firmware released within the last year. All manufacturers except NetComm had an average 
firmware age of less than 12 months. However, the limited number of devices from manufacturers like 
NetComm meant average release dates were not necessarily indicative of the normal support frequency from 
those manufacturers. 
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Figure 6 - Age of latest firmware release according to release notes 
The average firmware age is more significant for manufacturers with a larger number of devices represented in 
the survey. Comparison of the three most represented manufacturers Netgear, D-Link and TP-Link showed 
similar average firmware ages of nine months, six months, and seven months respectively. 
 
Manufacturer Average Firmware 
Age (months) 
Newest Device 
Firmware (months) 
Oldest Firmware 
(months) 
Devices in Survey 
(count) 
iiNet  1 1 1 1 
FRITZ!Box  1 1 1 1 
Billion  4 4 4 2 
D-Link  6 1 13 9 
TP-LINK  7 1 19 8 
Linksys  8 4 15 3 
NETGEAR  9 3 42 10 
NetComm  22 5 51 3 
Table 4 - Average, newest and oldest firmware by manufacturer 
 
Nearly all devices relied upon open-source Linux distributions for their embedded firmware operating system. 
Linux was the operating system in 95% of the deconstructed firmware; the exception was two TP-Link products 
that were using the ThreadX a real-time-operating-system (Express Logic, 2014). Over 75% of the Linux kernel 
versions identified were based on two versions: 2.6.30.x (42%) and 2.6.36.x (34%). 
 
84% 
11% 
5% 
Less than a year old
One to two years old
Older than two years
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Figure 7 - Kernel versions represented in extracted firmware 
The majority of Linux kernels identified were no longer actively maintained. The latest identified kernel was 
based on Linux 2.6.36.4 and was declared end-of-life in 2011; developers and users were advised to move to 
newer supported versions (Kroah-Hartman, 2011). Since Kroah-Hartman’s announcement, the 2.6.36 Linux 
kernel has seen 66 CVE vulnerabilities registered (CVE, 2015a). Three devices were found to be using the 
2.6.32 “long term release” kernel; however, their full version numbers (2.6.32.32 and 2.6.32.42) indicated 
release dates in 2011. These two kernel versions include 44 CVE vulnerabilities including several remote 
exploits (CVE, 2015b; CVE, 2015c). It is unclear as to whether the manufacturers of these three devices applied 
patches or updates for newer 2.6.32 releases prior to firmware compilation. The Linux kernel community only 
patches vulnerabilities in newer and supported kernels; patching vulnerabilities in obsolete kernels would be the 
responsibility of the respective manufacturers. 
Libraries and executable applications were also typically outdated or obsolete. The average age of firmware 
library and executable components ranged from three to ten years. Out of 54 distinct software versions 
identified, only two were released within the last two years and over half were over six years old. Every library 
and executable identified had a more recent or more supported version available. Obsolete software and versions 
with known security issues were found in every firmware image regardless of the manufacturer, device or 
firmware release date.  
Table 5 - Firmware component applications by average, newest and oldest version age 
 
Application/Library Average 
Age (Years) 
Newest Version 
(Years Old) 
Oldest Version 
(Age Years) 
Found in # of 
Firmware Images 
MiniDLNA 
(media server) 
3 3 4 6 
SQLite 
(Database) 
4 1 7 14 
Iptables 
(firewall mgmt.) 
5 2 12 25 
Busybox 
(shell) 
6 3 11 32 
OpenSSL 
(crypto/signing) 
7 1 10 17 
SSHd 
(ssh login serve) 
10 6 10 12 
DISCUSSION 
On the surface, device firmware appears to be relatively well maintained by manufacturers. Most current devices 
have received firmware releases within the year preceding the survey; however, upon closer examination, it is 
clear that even the newest firmware updates fail to address the fundamental issue of obsolete components. The 
42% 
34% 
19% 
5% 
Linux 2.6.30
Linux 2.6.36
Other Linux
Non-Linux
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 practice by most manufacturers appears to be that of building firmware that meets functional specifications and 
shipping it without any reasonable attempt to maintain the currency of installed components, or addressing 
component specific vulnerabilities (Constantin, 2014). 
Every device running Linux was using a discontinued and unsupported kernel. The kernel acts as the 
‘gatekeeper’ for all process, file-system and memory activities; it plays a core role in system management and 
security, and it is essential that vulnerabilities are patched in a timely fashion. Cyber criminals, security experts 
and software developers frequently identify vulnerabilities in kernels, shared libraries and applications. 
Vulnerabilities need to be patched and versions updated in a timely manner, as once made public, these 
vulnerabilities can be used to attack a device. Manufactures are responsible for ensuring faulty software is 
patched, or upgraded to newer versions. The report OWASP Top 10 2013 - The Ten Most Critical Web 
Application Security Risks (The OWASP Foundation, 2013), identifies the use of “known vulnerable 
components” as a major risk to web application security; this advice is also applicable to firmware developers as 
devices running old and un-patched software are primed for exploitation. 
The security community and media organisations are easily excitable when it comes to zero-day exploits. These 
types of new vulnerabilities are found in software with yet-to-be-released fixes, which leaves end-users 
vulnerable. Little attention is afforded to the masses of obsolete, exploitable software built in to SoHo device 
firmware. Obsolete software is potentially rife with many exploits that have been known for years, these well 
understood exploits present perfect opportunities for cyber criminals. Older exploits typically have readily 
available hacking scripts and tools that can be used to automate mass scale vulnerability scanning and device 
attacks. 
While major vulnerabilities are obvious, the survey revealed a deeper problem regarding the interaction between 
multiple components. Complex software interactions create a situation in which minor programming errors or 
exploits can be leveraged to completely compromise an entire network. For example, a minor fault in a media 
server may permit an SQL injection attack, which in turn could affect a vulnerable database server, which can in-
turn feed in to the device’s operating system “shell”. It is necessary to take a holistic view of embedded firmware 
to identify combinations of flawed components, configuration, and development practices that create conditions 
conducive to security breaches. 
Manufacturers appear to be pursuing the implementation of features with high visibility; the ‘coolest’ router, 
with the fastest Wi-Fi, built-in home entertainment server and one that provides the best gaming support. 
Marketing features are seducing end-users at the expense of good security practices. There appears to be no 
incentive for manufacturers to improve firmware security as the focus continually shifts to the development of 
new features to saturate the market (Constantin, 2014). There is also no simple way for users to evaluate the 
security of their device’s firmware. Analysis of obsolete and discontinued firmware components is a technical 
and laborious process requiring hours of expert analysis for each device. This complexity appears to be giving 
device manufacturers the cover they need to continue using poor firmware development and security practices. 
The pattern of manufacturers including obsolete components is unfortunately not surprising. It is consistent with 
the observations of industry experts and commentators who have repeatedly voiced concerns over the poor state 
of security in SoHo network devices (Armerding, 2015; Greene, 2015; Independent Security Evaluators, LLC., 
2015). Despite numerous warnings, very little seems to have changed. Fixing the state of SoHo router firmware 
may require incentives and pressure at a higher level for the issue to be addressed. 
A reward mechanism to recognise excellence in device firmware could provide end-user education and create an 
incentive for manufacturers to improve their products. A “star-rating” similar to those used by energy-efficiency, 
or vehicle safety ratings would benefit end-users. It may help to increase competition and improve accountability 
in the SoHo router market. A star-rating system would need to be administered by independent assessors and 
would need careful design to limit “gaming” of the system (Bevan & Hood, 2006). 
The SoHo network device industry appears to have done nothing to develop or standardise security 
requirements. Other industries have managed to self-regulate; for example, the payment card industry has 
developed security standards which have been widely adopted (PCI Security Standards Council, LLC., 2015). 
The opportunity exists for security researchers to work with the SoHo network device industry to develop a set 
of security principles and practices that could be adopted by manufacturers.  
Failing the adoption of an industry standard approach to security, legal and regulatory intervention may be 
required.  If manufacturers are knowingly including obsolete or broken firmware components, they may be 
failing in their duty of care toward end-users. If it can be shown that manufactures have repeatedly included 
these components against industry advice, it may suggest negligence on the part of manufacturers. A database 
providing firmware audits at the component level may provide evidence that is of use to lawmakers and 
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 regulatory authorities. A device firmware component database could also assist with holistic analysis of 
manufacturer development practices. 
While it is understandable that software issues will occur, it appears that manufacturers are trying to wash their 
hands of firmware liability; a brief review of manufacturer warranty information shows a reluctance to warrant 
the suitability of device firmware or software (D-Link Australia, n.d.; NETGEAR, 2007; TP-LINK Technologies 
Co. Ltd., n.d.); given that all SoHo devices are reliant upon firmware security, this situation and attitude cannot 
be allowed to continue.   
CONCLUSION 
This research identified SoHo network devices that are currently available in the Australian market. It succeeded 
in creating search strategies to accurately identify version information for: firmware operating system 
components; libraries; and applications. The search strategies were able to run quickly and utilised Linux-based 
tools and commands that were easily accessible and could be automated. The version information identified for 
selected firmware components was analysed and showed that every SoHo network device contained obsolete 
operating systems and software components. 
An opportunity exists to create further automated firmware assessment tools. These tools could be used to 
identify software versions from reverse engineered blocks of binary code. The tools could utilise a database of 
customised search strategies for fast pattern matching. The tools could be used to scan manufacturer firmware 
releases and provide reporting on the underlying components, versions and potential vulnerabilities. The tool 
could be designed to produce technical reports for analysis by security professionals, as well as simplified 
reporting to inform and educate end-users.  
Further research should also be undertaken to examine the feasibility of incentive and regulatory mechanisms. 
Research should identify ways to improve manufacturer security practices and transparency of embedded 
firmware components. The research should seek to develop processes, tools and standards that can be applied to 
assess and improve the security of SoHo device firmware. 
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